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ABSTRACT
We proposed and tested the notion of a bidirectional influence of emotion
expressions and context. In two studies (N = 215, N = 222), we found that the
expressions shown by supporters and opponents of a player in a ball game were
used by observers to correctly deduce the eliciting situation – i.e. the outcome of
the game. Conversely, knowledge of the outcome of the game (as well as real
world knowledge of the negative interdependence of opponents in a competitive
game) influenced the perception of both the emotions shown (Study 1) and the
perceived bias/emotional control exhibited by the expressers (Study 2). This
research contributes to a growing body of research that shows that both situations
and emotion expressions contain intrinsic meaningful information and that both
sources of information are used by observers in a social appraisal process.
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In every-day life we rarely see facial expressions
devoid of context. Rather, we see people who are
interacting with others or with objects in meaningful
surroundings that can influence our interpretation of
the facial expressions shown. Hence, the wrinkled
nose of a person walking through a fish market will
be perceived differently from the wrinkled nose of
someone observing a social faux pas. In recent years,
emotion research has increasingly emphasised the
importance of context for emotion perception (e.g.
Barrett, Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011; Hess & Hareli,
2015). In fact, constructivist theories of emotion con-
sider context to be of preeminent importance when
it comes to constructing meaning from emotional
exchanges (for an overview see, e.g. Faucher, 2013).
From this perspective, facial expressions are described
as inherently ambiguous and their interpretation as
strongly dependant on the context in which they are
shown (Hassin, Aviezer, & Bentin, 2013). From this
view then, the interpretation of a particular type of
emotion expression is defined primarily by the kind
of situation (i.e. context) in which the expression is
observed (Clore & Ortony, 2013).
Recently, we proposed that this influence is bidirec-
tional (Hess, Landmann, David, & Hareli, 2017). That is,
just as the context influences the interpretation of
facial expressions, these expressions have sufficient
intrinsic meaning to conversely influence the
interpretation of the situation that elicited them.
The reverse engineering of situational
information
The notion that emotional expressions can signify situ-
ations can be derived from appraisal theories of
emotion. According to appraisal theories of emotion,
emotions are elicited and differentiated through a
series of appraisals of (internal or external) stimulus
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events based on the perceived nature of the event
(e.g. Scherer, 1987; Frijda, 1986). Importantly in this
context, facial expressive behaviour has been
posited to be a direct readout of appraisal outcomes
(Kaiser & Wehrle, 2001; Scherer, 1992; Smith & Scott,
1997).
Further, participants can reconstruct both their
own appraisals (Robinson & Clore, 2002) and those
of the protagonist of a story (e.g. Hareli & Hess,
2010; Roseman, 1991; Scherer & Grandjean, 2008).
This information can then be used to deduce
additional information about the expresser or the situ-
ation from the expresser’s behaviour in a process we
call reverse engineering (Hareli & Hess, 2010).
More generally, any information that is relevant to
appraisals can be used to predict emotional reactions
when the appraisals are known and conversely to
deduce the appraisals when the reaction is known.
For example, the mere fact that someone reacts with
an emotion to an event signals that the event is rel-
evant to that specific person, which in turn provides
information about the person’s goals and values as
well as about the event. That is, knowing that a
person reacted, for example, with happiness to the
win of a team, allows the observer to conclude that
the person cares about the team’s success. Conversely,
knowing that someone cares about a team’s success
allows the conclusion that a win would elicit happi-
ness. This in turn allows the conclusion that a happy
facial expression shown by someone who cares
about a given team, signals that the team won.
In short, because appraisals are based on infor-
mation about the situation (in light of the goals,
resources and values of the perceiver), the resulting
facial expression necessarily also provides information
about the situation. Yet, at the same time, other types
of contextual information such as the social roles of
the expressers or their relationship to each other can
be informative as well (Hess & Kirouac, 2000; Kirouac
& Hess, 1999). We propose that observers use perspec-
tive taking to balance these different types of infor-
mation when drawing conclusions about a person’s
goals and motives but also when decoding their
emotion expressions.
Identifying emotions from nonverbal cues
Specifically, there are two ways to identify emotions
from nonverbal cues (Kirouac & Hess, 1999). The tra-
ditional context-free research on emotion recognition
implicitly assumes a pattern matching process, where
specific features of the expression are associated
with specific emotions (Buck, 1984). For example,
upturned corners of the mouth or lowered brows
are recognised as smiles or frowns respectively and
a perceiver can thus conclude that the individual is
happy or angry. In this process, the perceiver is a
passive decoder who could, and in fact can, be
replaced by an automated system and context infor-
mation plays no role or only a minimal one (e.g.
Dailey, Cottrell, Padgett, & Adolphs, 2002).
However, in many situations the perceiver can also
use a second process – perspective taking. Knowing
the goals and values of others or the specific situation
they are in allows the perceiver to take their perspec-
tive and to infer their likely emotional state. The bidir-
ectional model of emotion perception combines the
process of reverse engineering of the appraisals of
others with perspective taking (see Figure 1) by pro-
posing that reverse engineered or social appraisals
function as input for perspective taking.
A bidirectional model of emotion and situation
perception
The model (see Figure 1) posits that someone who
observes an event (the observer), appraises the situ-
ation him or herself (personal appraisal, dashed
black line) and (re)acts based on that appraisal as
claimed by appraisal theories (e.g. Scherer, 1987).
When other individuals also witness the event (wit-
nesses), their emotion expressions reflect their own
appraisal of the situation (dashed grey line) and
allow the reverse engineering of their appraisal of
the situation. These social appraisals (see also,
Fischer & Manstead, 2008) can be used by the
Figure 1. The bidirectional social perception model.
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observer as input information to further refine their
personal appraisal – together with other situational
information. The personal appraisal of the situation
by the observer then impacts – via perspective
taking – on the observer’s interpretation of the wit-
nesses’ emotion expression. That is, both sources of
information – personal appraisal and social appraisal
– impact on each other.
Notably, when the observer does not see the event
directly or is missing information to understand the
meaning of the event, the witnesses’ expressions
can – via the link through social appraisal – substitute
as source for situational information (solid grey line
labelled perspective taking). Importantly, this infor-
mation can then be used by the observer to re-evalu-
ate the meaning of the expressions shown by the
witnesses.
For example, a team winning a game should be a
pleasant and goal conducive event for a supporter
of that team but not for an opponent, that is, a sup-
porter of the opposing team, for whom this event
should be goal obstructive. These appraisals
should reflect themselves in the emotional
expressions shown. We propose that when partici-
pants (observers) rate the facial expressions of
witness A who experienced a positive event that
is however negative for witness B, as in the situation
above, they will take into account the facial
expressions of both individuals and reverse engin-
eer their respective appraisal of the situation.
Importantly, this information serves as input for per-
spective taking and allows the participants to adjust
their interpretation of the facial expressions shown
by both witnesses.
Let us assume that an observer sees that, after the
last throw of a game, the supporter of team A shows a
big smile and the supporter of team B a neutral
expression. From the smile they can deduce that
something goal conducive and pleasant happened.
Given the context, a game was just finished, they
can deduce that the team supported by that person
has won. This information can then be used to inter-
pret the neutral expression shown by B, who supports
the losing team and based on perspective taking
should experience negative affect because observers
know that losing a game typically elicits negative
emotions. Perspective taking then leads to an attribu-
tion of less positive affect to the supporter of the
losing team, even when this person shows a neutral
or even a happy expression (perhaps to put up a
brave front).
In short, observers will use the facial expressions of
witnesses to an event to reverse engineer the apprai-
sals of these expressers and at the same time use
those social appraisals to deduce their likely emotional
state, even if this state is incongruent with the
emotions expressed. In other words, we posit that
the social perception of an emotion depends neither
on the expressions alone nor on the context alone.
Rather, it is determined by a combination of the two
as well as the real world knowledge of the perceiver.
In this process, the perceiver is seen as an active
agent who balances all available information to
arrive at a social judgment.
The present research had the goal to test this pre-
diction. Specifically, we tested the notion that (a) the
expression of a witness to an event provides infor-
mation about the event that caused this expression,
(b) this situational information then informs the obser-
ver’s own perception of the situation, which (c) in turn
impacts on the observer’s perception of the witnessed
emotion.
The present research
To test this model we selected the sports context
described above. This context is particularly suitable
as there are clear motivational goals associated with
being a supporter of a team and there is a clear nega-
tive interdependence between supporters of oppos-
ing teams. Thus, a supporter of team A can be
expected to consider anything that advances team
A’s chances of winning as goal conducive and any-
thing that advances team B’s chances of winning as
goal obstructive. Goal conducive events elicit happi-
ness (Scherer, 1987) and conversely, using reverse
engineering (Hareli & Hess, 2010), participants can
conclude that when a supporter of team A reacts
with happiness, the eliciting event is good for team
A and hence should be bad for team B. Participants
saw both the supporter of the player and a supporter
of the opposing team at the same time, to make the
motivational negative interdependence between
these two witnesses to the event salient.
Finally, we added a third emotion: awe. Awe is
characterised by a realisation of the presence of some-
thing greater than the self, as well as some disengage-
ment from awareness of the self (Shiota, Keltner, &
Mossman, 2007). As such, the expression of awe
should transcend the negative interdependence struc-
ture of the expressions of happiness vs. neutrality:
showing awe in response to an event should not
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depend on whether the expresser supports the
player’s team or not. As such, this emotion makes an
interesting control condition as it has been shown to
be less susceptible to context information about the
expresser, because an extraordinary outcome “stands
above” the specific motivations of supporters and
opponents and is recognised as extraordinary by
both (Hareli, Elkabetz, & Hess, 2019).
We predicted that participants will use the negative
interdependence of the goals of a supporter of the
player and an opponent’s team supporter in combi-
nation with their expressions (happy, neutral, awe)
to deduce (a) the nature of the emotion eliciting
event, i.e. whether the player played well or not, (b)
use this information about the situation to re-evaluate
their judgment of the actors’ likely emotional states in
light of this outcome. That is, we predict a bidirectional
relationship between these two sources of infor-
mation, resulting in mutual influence.
In two studies, participants were shown a series of
images from a fictitious ball game taken from Hareli
et al. (2019). A fictitious game was chosen so that
individual differences in knowledge of the game
would not interfere with the social perception
process. Participants first saw a series of images
which depicted the playing field as well as spectators
who either supported the team of the player cur-
rently on the field (supporters) or the opposing
team (opponents). The teams were identified by
the colour of their T-shirts. The picture showing the
last throw was followed by a photo depicting one
supporter of the player and one supporter of the
opponent team, showing the same or different
emotions (Figure 2 shows the last three images
depicting the game, Figure 3 shows an example of
the two expressers).
Based on results from Study 1, which suggested that
participants may trust opponents’ expressions more
than supporters’ expressions, in Study 2 we addressed
the question of whether participants would judge the
expression shown by supporters as less authentic. All
data are available upon request from the authors. The
research meets the ethical guidelines, including
adherence to the legal requirements for the Hum-
boldt-University of Berlin. We report all exclusions,
measurements and manipulations.
Study 1
Study 1 was designed to test the notion that partici-
pants are able to deduce the likely situational
context (i.e. the outcome of the game) based on the
emotion expressions shown by supporters and
opponents and that this reverse engineered situa-
tional information would in turn affect ratings of the
emotion expressions.
Figure 2. Example images describing the game.
Figure 3. Examples of facial expressions used in studies 1 and 2.
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Method
Participants
A total of 215 (126 women) participants with a mean
age of 38 years (SD = 12) who were recruited through
Amazon MTurk completed the study and passed
control questions probing for attention. We aimed in
both studies for a minimum of 20 participants per cell
in a complete between-participants design.
Stimulus materials
Facial expressions. Facial expressions of awe, happi-
ness and neutrality by six men and women were
taken from the Haifa Set of Facial Expressions of
Emotions (HSFEE, Hareli et al., 2019). Digital image
manipulation was used to colour the actors’ shirts
(blue = supporter; yellow = opponent of the player)
and to create sets of one supporter and one
opponent of the same sex showing either awe, hap-
piness or a neutral expression in all possible combi-
nations. Faces were counterbalanced between
conditions, such that the same individuals were
shown as supporters or opponents and appearing
on the left or right side of the photo respectively
for half the participants. Each participant saw only
one condition.
Ball game. Participants first saw the ten photos that
depicted a fictitious, boule-like ball game (see
Figure 2, for the last three images). Participants
saw in sequence: the game field, pictures of people
watching the game, a person taking his turn in the
game and throwing a ball, and the position of the
three balls thrown by the player. This last image in
the set (which depicted the outcome of the final
throw) was followed by the “reaction” of one of the
player’s supporters (henceforth “supporter”) and
one of the opponent’s supporters (henceforth
“opponent”) shown next to each other (see Figure
3 for an example). Supporters and opponents were
distinguished by the colour of their t-shirt. Partici-
pants saw in the photos that the blue team was
playing. To ensure that participants could tell who
is a supporter of the player and who of the
opponent, labels below each photo reminded them
of that.
Procedure and dependent measures
The study was conducted in a between-participants
design and each participant saw only one game and
one combination of reactions by one supporter and
one opponent. Following the sequence of photos, par-
ticipants were first asked to briefly describe what they
thought the purpose of the game was, based only on
what they had observed. This served to make sure that
they had paid attention to the sequence of images.
Participants then answered five questions about the
outcome of the play and the quality of the perform-
ance of the player (likelihood that the player won
the game, what was the quality of the performance,
player’s skill level, player’s performance relative to
the standard performance, chances that the player’s
performance had set a new record). As these corre-
lated substantially (r = .57 to r = .78) they were com-
bined into one variable called performance quality (α
= .92). Finally, participants rated the intensity of the
emotions shown by the supporter and the opponent
respectively on six single item scales. These were
labelled awe, happiness and neutral together with
the team label to make sure that the participants
knew which of the two individuals’ expression they
were rating. The scales were anchored with 1 – very
low to 7 – very high.
Data analysis plan.We first assessed whether partici-
pants were indeed able to deduce the performance
quality of the player from the witnesses’ expressions.
For this, we conducted a 3 (supporter emotion con-
dition: awe, happiness, neutral) × 3 (opponent
emotion condition: awe, happiness, neutral) between
subjects ANOVA on the rated performance quality.
The results were followed-up by post-hoc tests
(p < .05).
We then examined two questions. First, does the
quality of the player’s performance as indexed by
the opponent’s expression impact on the perception
of the supporter’s expression? We predicted that a
happy expression shown by the opponent would
signal a loss by the player’s team (i.e. low player per-
formance quality) and in turn would lead to a
reduction in perceived happiness of the supporter.
By contrast, a neutral expression shown by the
opponent should signal a win by the player’s team
(i.e. high player performance quality) and in turn
would increase ratings of the supporter’s happiness.
We then used mediation analyses to test the pre-
diction that it is the indirect effect of opponent
emotion condition on player performance quality
that predicts the change in rated supporter emotion
intensity. Finally, we conducted the same set of ana-
lyses for supporter emotion condition as a predictor
of rated opponent emotion intensity.
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Results
Did participants deduce the performance quality
of the player’s last throw based on the emotion
expressions shown by supporter and opponent?
A 3 (supporter emotion condition: awe, happiness,
neutral) × 3 (opponent emotion condition: awe, happi-
ness, neutral) between subjects ANOVA was con-
ducted on the composite performance quality scale.
As predicted, the main effects of supporter emotion
condition, F(2,206) = 68.79, p < .001, h2p = .40, and
opponent emotion condition were significant F
(2,206) = 17.28, p < .001, h2p = .14. Post-hoc tests
revealed that participants evaluated the player’s per-
formance quality as significantly better when the sup-
porter showed happiness (M = 5.42, SD = .84, CI95%
5.21; 5.61) than when the supporter showed awe (M
= 4.66, SD = 1.48, CI95% 4.29; 5.02) or a neutral
expression (M = 3.21, SD = 1.35, CI95% 2.92; 3.51).
Conversely, the player’s performance was rated as
significantly better when the opponent showed
either a neutral expression (M = 4.67, SD = 1.33, CI95%
4.37; 4.98) or awe (M = 4.56, SD = 1.67, CI95% 4.19;
4.94), which did not differ, than when the opponent
showed happiness (M = 3.72, SD = 1.52, CI95% 3.33;
4.10). Thus, participants correctly deduced that the
happiness of a supporter and the neutral expression
of an opponent both signal that the player played
well. Conversely, a neutral expression by a supporter
and a happy expression by an opponent signalled
that he did not play well, i.e. he lost the game.
Awe by either the supporter or the opponent indi-
cated a good play, in line with the notion that awe in a
performance context signals that a standard was
exceeded (Hareli et al., 2019). Importantly, as
expected, the meaning of awe was not dependent
on the allegiance of the expresser.
We then assessed whether knowledge of the
outcome of the game, as signalled by either the sup-
porter’s or the opponent’s expressions, influenced
the perception of the emotion shown by the respect-
ive other person.
The influence of the situational information
indexed by the opponent’s facial expression on
the perception of the supporter’s emotional state
To assess the influence of the opponents’ expression
on the perceived expressions of supporters, we first
conducted a 3 (supporter expression condition: awe,
happiness, neutrality) × 3 (opponent expression con-
dition: awe, happiness, neutrality) between subjects
ANOVA on the emotion intensity ratings for the sup-
porters’ expressions (see upper part of Table 1 for
F-values and upper part of Table 2 for means).
Trivially, main effects of supporter emotion con-
dition on the rated intensity of the supporter’s
expression emerged. Specifically, post-hoc tests
revealed significant differences, such that the supporter
was rated as most happy when showing happiness, as
most in awe when showing awe and as most neutral
when showing neutrality – independently of the
emotion of the opponent. This was expected as vali-
dated emotion expressions had been used as stimuli.
Importantly, the predicted significant influence of
opponent expression on ratings of the supporter’s
Table 1. Effects of supporter’s and opponent’s expressions condition on emotion intensity ratings.
Dependent variable Effect F DF P ηp
2
Supporter’s happiness Supporter emotion 117.98 2, 206 .000 .53
Opponent’s emotion 14.01 2, 206 .000 .12
Supporter’s X opponent’s emotion 3.47 4, 205 .009 .06
Supporter’s awe Supporter emotion 72.44 2, 206 .000 .41
Opponent’s emotion 5.87 2, 206 .003 .05
Supporter’s X opponent’s emotion 2.70 4, 205 .032 .05
Supporter’s neutrality Supporter emotion 59.80 2, 206 .000 .37
Opponent’s emotion 7.21 2, 206 .001 .07
Supporter’s X opponent’s emotion 7.44 4, 205 .000 .13
Opponent’s happiness Supporter emotion 16.78 2, 206 .000 .14
Opponent’s emotion 118.80 2, 206 .000 .54
Supporter’s X opponent’s emotion 3.65 4, 205 .007 .07
Opponent’s awe Supporter emotion 1.15 2, 206 .32 .01
Opponent’s emotion 86.41 2, 206 .000 .46
Supporter’s X opponent’s emotion 1.24 4, 205 .75 .01
Opponent’s neutrality Supporter emotion 1.44 2, 206 .24 .01
Opponent’s emotion 56.80 2, 206 .000 .36
Supporter’s X opponent’s emotion 3.64 4, 205 .007 .07
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expressions emerged as well. Specifically, for all sup-
porter emotion intensity ratings, significant main
effects of opponent emotion expression condition as
well as significant supporter x opponent emotion
expression condition interactions (see the upper part
of Table 1) emerged. That is, as predicted, the per-
ceived intensity with which the supporter expressed
emotions varied as a function of the emotion shown
by the opponent. For example, supporters who
showed happiness were rated as significantly less
happy when the opponent also expressed happiness
but not when the opponent expressed awe or neu-
trality. This finding is congruent with the idea that sup-
porters and opponents cannot both be happy but
both can be in awe. Thus, participants “adjusted”
their happiness ratings for a happy supporter in light
of the situational information signalled by the
expression of the opponent.
Mediation analysis. To assess whether the impact of
opponent expression condition on rated supporter
emotion intensity was, indeed, mediated by the situa-
tional information provided by the opponent’s
expression, we conducted a mediation analysis using
PROCESS 3.1 (Hayes, 2017). For this, we contrasted
happiness and neutrality shown by the opponent to
predict the perceived emotion of the supporter as
mediated by perceived performance. We excluded
awe as independent variable from this analysis as
awe should always signal that the game was won
and can therefore not be contrasted against either
happiness or neutrality.
The independent variable, therefore, was opponent
expression condition (0 – neutral, 1 – happy). We pre-
dicted that opponent expression signals perceived
player performance quality, or in other words, situa-
tional information about the game. In turn, situational
information about the game should predict intensity
ratings for supporter emotion. Hence, perceived
player performance quality was the mediating variable
and the three dependent variables were perceived
intensity of supporter happiness, neutrality and awe.
The results are shown in Table 3 upper panel.
As expected, opponent facial expression condition
significantly predicted player performance, such that a
happy opponent was associated with lower perform-
ance quality ratings. Further, perceived performance
quality significantly and positively predicted perceived
supporter happiness and awe. While the direct effect
from opponent expressions to perceived supporter
happiness/awe was not significant, the predicted
indirect effect through perceived player performance
quality was significant for both happiness and awe
(see Table 3).
Further, performance quality significantly and
negatively predicted perceived supporter neutrality.
Both the direct effect from opponent facial expression
condition to perceived supporter emotion, b = 1.54, p
< .001, and the predicted indirect effect through per-
ceived player performance quality were significant.
In sum, as hypothesised, the expressions shown by
Table 2. Mean ratings of supporter’s and opponent’s expressions condition as a function of supporter’s and opponent’s expressions Study 1.
Dependent variable Supporter’s awe Supporter’s happiness Supporter’s neutrality
Opponent’s Emotion Supporter’s Emotion M SD CI95% M SD CI95% M SD CI95%
Awe Awe 5.83 0.99 5.14; 6.53 5.33 1.57 4.66; 6.01 1.44 0.86 0.77;2.12
Happiness 4.88 1.66 4.31;5.47 6.00 1.27 5.44;6.56 1.50 0.81 0.94;2.07
Neutral 2.00 1.48 1.49;2.51 2.15 1.74 1.65;2.64 4.53 2.19 4.04;5.02
Happiness Awe 4.37 1.86 3.69;5.05 3.00 1.97 2.34;3.66 1.74 1.15 1.08;2.40
Happiness 3.68 1.64 3.05;4.31 5.50 1.10 4.89;6.11 1.95 1.33 1.34;2.57
Neutral 2.29 1.77 1.64;2.93 1.81 1.33 1.18;2.44 2.48 1.37 1.34;2.57
Neutral Awe 5.64 1.19 5.08;6.20 5.29 1.38 4.74;5.83 2.14 1.30 1.60;2.69
Happiness 4.33 1.11 3.69;4.98 6.10 1.18 5.47;6.72 1.76 1.04 1.13;2.39
Neutral 2.28 1.57 2.07;3.23 2.69 1.35 2.13; 3.26 5.12 1.86 4.55;5.68
Dependent Variable Opponent’s Awe Opponent’s happiness Opponent’s Neutrality
Awe Awe 6.00 0.69 5.25;6.75 3.78 1.63 3.11;4.45 1.50 1.04 0.76;2.24
Happiness 5.15 1.97 4.53;5.76 2.58 1.53 2.02;3.14 1.88 1.50 1.27;2.50
Neutral 5.44 1.99 4.90;5.98 5.09 2.08 4.60;5.58 1.47 1.02 0.94;2.01
Happiness Awe 3.79 1.58 3.96;4.52 5.74 1.20 5.08;6.39 1.84 1.07 1.13;2.56
Happiness 3.77 1.66 3.10;4.45 5.36 1.22 4.76;5.97 2.18 1.59 1.52;2.85
Neutral 4.10 2.19 1.65;2.85 6.38 1.02 5.76;7.00 1.90 1.41 1.22;2.59
Neutral Awe 2.25 1.32 1.17;2.55 2.29 1.41 1.75;2.82 4.00 2.07 3.41;4.59
Happiness 1.86 0.91 1.67;2.55 1.52 0.98 .90;2.15 3.43 2.06 2.75;4.11
Neutral 2.04 1.15 1.42;2.66 2.15 1.16 1.60;2.71 5.19 1.92 4.58;5.81
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the opponent predicted perceived performance
quality, which in turn predicted perceived supporter
happiness, awe and neutrality.
The influence of the situational information
indexed by the supporter’s facial expression on
the perception of the opponent’s emotional state
To assess the converse influence of the expression of
supporters on the perceived expression intensity of
opponents, a 3 (supporter expression condition: awe,
happiness, neutrality) × 3 (opponent expression con-
dition: awe, happiness, neutrality) between subjects
ANOVA was conducted on ratings of the intensity of
the opponents’ expressions (see lower part of Table
1 for F-values and lower part of Table 2 for means).
Similar to the results for supporters, significant
main effects of opponent expression condition
emerged for ratings of the intensity of the opponent’s
happiness, awe and neutrality. Post-hoc tests revealed
that the opponent was rated as most happy when
showing happiness, as most in awe when showing
awe and as most neutral when showing neutrality
(see Tables 1 and 2).
Further, significant opponent by supporter
expression condition interactions suggested that
emotions shown by the supporter influenced the per-
ception of the opponent’s happiness and neutrality.
However, this was not the case for opponent awe
for which only a main effect of opponent expression
emerged significantly (see the lower part of Table 1).
Mediation analysis. To assess whether the impact of
supporter expression on opponent emotion was
mediated by the situational information provided by
the supporter’s expression, we conducted a mediation
analysis using PROCESS 3.1 (Hayes, 2017) using the
same approach as detailed above (see Table 3 lower
panel).
Supporter expression condition positively pre-
dicted perceived player performance, which in turn
negatively predicted the perceived intensity of
opponent happiness. However, perceived player per-
formance quality did not predict opponent awe or
neutrality. None of the direct links from supporter
expression condition to perceived opponent
emotion were significant.
In sum, only perceived opponent happiness was
significantly predicted by the indirect effect of suppor-
ter expression condition on perceived performance
quality. This may suggest that participants did not
fully trust the supporter’s expressions to signal the
type of situation that would have resulted in opponent
neutrality (a good throw by the player which would
mean that the opponent’s team lost) or awe (if the
throw has been outstanding). This in turn may
suggest that perceivers consider supporters to be
more likely than opponents to mask their expressions,
for example, by putting on a “brave face.” That is,
participants might consider supporter emotion
expressions to be less trustworthy and hence less
informative than opponent expressions. As a conse-
quence, they did not use the supporter’s expression
to adjust their perception of the opponent’s emotions.
Discussion
In all, the findings from Study 1 suggest that partici-
pants’ ratings of the supporters’ and, to a lesser
degree, the opponents’ emotion expressions were
mediated by their knowledge about the likely goals
of the expressers and the situational information
they derived from these very emotion expressions.
Table 3. Results of mediation analyses Study 1.








b = 1.20*** Happiness b =−1.15
CI95 [−1.74, −.57]





b = 2.20*** Perceived performance b = .11 n.s. Awe b = .24
CI95 [−.49, .97]
b =−.89*** Happiness b =−1.95,
CI95 [−2.68, −1.28]
b = .12 n.s. Neutrality b = .27,
CI95 [−.31, 1.00]
N.B. *** p < .001
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Thus, these findings suggest that, when rating the
emotions expressed by the supporter/opponent, par-
ticipants considered the meaning of both expressions
with regard to the outcome of the game.
It is important to remember that participants were
clearly instructed to rate the expressive behaviour of
each person separately. Nonetheless, participants
used the complete information available to assess
the situation and deduce the likely emotion felt by
the expresser and from there judged the expression.
Specifically, the ANOVA results showed that partici-
pants rated the focal emotions of supporters and
opponents according to the emotion category they
were drawn from. That is, happy expressions were
rated as most happy, awe expressions as showing
most awe and neutral expressions as most neutral.
However, the mediation analysis, which focused on
the potentially contradictory emotional reactions of
opponents and supporters – happiness and neutrality,
showed that observers used the situational infor-
mation conveyed by these expressions to judge the
likely emotional state of the observed person and cor-
respondingly adjust their ratings as predicted by the
bidirectional model proposed.
Study 2
Results from study 1 provide support for the idea that
participants employ perspective taking, based on their
understanding of the situation, to assess the “real”
emotion felt by a person. However, whereas opponent
emotion expression had a pervasive impact on all three
perceived supporter emotions, this was not the case for
the influence of supporter emotion expressions on
opponent emotion. Specifically, the expression reflect-
ing the situational information derived from the sup-
porter’s expressions was not predictive of the
opponent’s neutrality or awe. Since an opponent
would show neutrality and potentially awe when the
player plays well and the supporter’s team wins, this
suggests that the observers may not have believed
the supporter’s positive expressions (indicating such
a win) to be always honest. That only trusted
expressions are used for perspective taking would
support the notion that it is indeed the situational
information gleaned from the observer’s expression
which influences the emotion ratings and not a direct
effect of expression (such as, for example, a contrast
effect). We therefore conducted a second study to
assess the notion that participants may not trust sup-
porter expressions as much as opponent expressions
and therefore do not consider supporters’ expressions
to provide valid information on the situation, which
could be used for perspective taking.
Trust requires three elements: Ability, benevolence
and integrity (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995).
Ability in this context refers to expertise. Thus, if par-
ticipants believe that the supporter is less knowledge-
able than the opponent then they should trust the
supporter’s reactions, and hence his or her expression,
less. Benevolence and integrity in this context refer to
the notion that the expresser is not hiding or masking
their emotions to mislead the observer. We therefore
asked participants about the perceived expertise of
the supporter and the opponent respectively as well
as whether they felt that these individuals were




A total of 222 (85 women, 1 gender unknown) partici-
pants with a mean age of 35 years (SD = 11) who were
recruited through Amazon MTurk completed the
study and passed control questions probing for
attention.
Procedure and dependent measures
The same stimulus materials as for Study 1 were used.
Following the sequence of photos, participants were
again first asked to briefly describe what they thought
the purpose of the game was. They then rated the
player’s performance quality using the same five
scales as in Study 1. These scales were again correlated
(r = .42 to r = .83) and hence combined into one variable
called performance quality (α = .92). We then asked,
using single item scales, for the perceived expertise of
the opponent and supporter respectively to assess
whether the supporters and opponents are seen as
equally competent to assess the quality of the play.
Finally, participants rated, for both the supporter and
the opponent, how biased their judgment seemed to
be and the extent to which they tried to control their
expression. We used the word “bias” because this
term is commonly used to refer to someone whose
judgment may favour one group over another.
Results
We first verified whether participants were able to
deduce the quality of the performance of the player
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as in Study 1. For this, a 3 (supporter emotion condition:
awe, happiness, neutral) × 3 (opponent emotion con-
dition: awe, happiness, neutral) was conducted on the
composite performance quality scale. Significant main
effects of supporter emotion condition, F(2,213) =
94.44, p < .001, h2p = .47, and opponent emotion con-
dition, F(2,213) = 32.10, p < .001, h2p = .23, as well as a
significant supporter by opponent emotion condition
interaction emerged, F(4,213) = 7.36, p < .001, h2p = .12
(see Figure 4 for means and standard errors).
As in Study 1, participants evaluated the player’s
performance as significantly better when the suppor-
ter showed happiness than when the supporter
showed a neutral expression, irrespective of the
emotion shown by the opponent. Correspondingly,
the player’s performance quality was rated as signifi-
cantly better when the opponent showed either a
neutral expression or awe, which did not differ, and
worst when the opponent showed happiness. That
is, participants deduced that the team whose
member showed happiness won the game and
judged the player performance accordingly.
Performance was rated as relatively low when the
supporter showed neutrality, suggesting that percei-
vers followed the supporters’ evaluation that the
player had not played well. However, it was rated as
significantly higher when the opponent showed
awe. By contrast, even though performance was gen-
erally rated higher when the supporter showed either
awe or happiness, perceived performance was rated
as significantly lower when the opponent showed
happiness. This may be due to the notion suggested
above, that the positive expression of a supporter is
not always seen as indicative of a truly excellent per-
formance. That this reduction was less extreme
when the opponent showed awe while the supporter
showed happiness supports the notion that awe is not
dependent on the allegiance of the expresser as it
signals an outstanding achievement.
Perceived expertise
To assess whether the supporter or the opponent was
considered a better judge of the game, a mixed model
ANOVA with the within-subjects factor team (suppor-
ter vs opponent) and the between subjects factors
opponent emotion condition and supporter emotion
condition on perceived expertise was conducted. Sig-
nificant main effects of team, F(1,213) = 10.68, p = .001,
h2p = .05, supporter emotion condition, F(2,213) =
15.93, p < .001, h2p = .13 and opponent emotion con-
dition, F(2,213) = 10.72, p < .001, h2p = .09, emerged.
These main effects were qualified by a team by sup-
porter emotion condition, F(2,213) = 17.95, p < .001,
h2p = .14, a team by opponent emotion condition, F
(2,213) = 6.61, p = .002, h2p = .06 and an opponent by
supporter emotion condition interaction, F(4,213) =
2.65, p = .035, h2p = .05.
Overall, the expertise of the supporter was rated as
significantly higher (M = 5.27, SD = 1.29, CI95% 5.10;
5.45) than the expertise of the opponent (M = 4.99,
SD = 1.55, CI95% 4.78; 5.18, t221 = 3.31, p = .001). Inter-
estingly, perceived expertise was also influenced by
the emotions shown by both expressers. Simple
effects analyses were conducted separately for sup-
porter and opponent.
Supporter
A 3 (opponent emotion condition) by 3 (supporter
emotion condition) ANOVA, revealed significant
main effects of opponent emotion condition, F
(2,213) = 7.99, p < .001, h2p = .07, supporter emotion
condition, F(2,213) = 34.32, p < .001, h2p = .24, as well
Figure 4. Perceived performance quality of the player as a function of
supporter expression and opponent expression.
Figure 5. Mean rated expertise of the supporter as a function of sup-
porter and opponent emotion expression.
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as a significant interaction, F(4,213) = 3.11, p = .016, h2p
= .06 (see Figure 5 for means and standard errors).
Overall, post-hoc tests revealed that the suppor-
ter’s expertise was rated as highest when the suppor-
ter showed happiness, followed by awe and lowest
when the supporter showed a neutral expression.
Further, the supporter’s expertise was rated signifi-
cantly higher when the opponent showed a “match-
ing” expression. That is, when the opponent showed
happiness while the supporter showed neutrality
and vice versa. In these cases, the two emotions lead
to the same conclusion about the game outcome
and therefore confirm each other.
Awe expressions shown by opponents increased
perceptions of expertise when the supporter did not
show happiness. Thus, participants again considered
both expressions and while they overall considered
the expertise of the supporter to be higher than the
expertise of the opponent, this evaluation dropped
when the opponent’s expression could not be easily
reconciled with the expression of the supporter.
Opponent
For opponent expertise only, the main effect of
opponent expression condition, F(2,213) = 9.73, p
< .001, h2p = .08, was significant, such that expressions
of awe (M = 4.68, SD = 1.22, CI95% 4.40; 4.97) and hap-
piness, (M = 4.63, SD = 1.24, CI95% 4.36; 4.90), which did
not differ, signalled greater expertise than neutral
expressions (M = 3.80, SD = 1.30, CI95% 3.48; 4.14).
Thus, for both supporters and opponents a neutral
expression was seen as less indicative of expertise,
which may suggest that this expression was con-
sidered a “default” that could also signal indifference.
That the expertise of the opponent does not depend
on the emotion of the supporter could be a sign
that even though participants consider supporters as
higher in expertise they do not trust their expression
fully and therefore do not use it to gauge the
opponent’s expertise. Hence, the expression of the
opponent serves as a gauge for the reliability of the
supporter’s expression but not vice versa.
Bias. An ANOVA with the within factor team (suppor-
ter vs. opponent) x and the between factors opponent
emotion condition (awe, happiness, neutral) and sup-
porter emotion condition (awe, happiness, neutral)
revealed a significant main effect of team, F(1,213) =
11.59, p = .001, h2p = .05, and a significant team by sup-
porter emotion interaction, F(1,213) = 3.17, p = .044,
h2p = .03. As expected, participants considered the
expressions of the supporter to be more biased (M =
5.27, SD = 1.29, CI95% 5.09; 5.44) than those of the
opponent (M = 4.89, SD = 1.56, CI95% 4.76; 5.18). No
significant main effects or interactions emerged for
perceived bias in the simple effects analyses con-
ducted separately for each team.
Control
A 2 (team) by 3 (opponent emotion) by 3 (supporter
emotion) ANOVA, revealed a team by supporter
emotion condition, F(2,213) = 7.79, p = .001, h2p = .07,
and a team by opponent emotion condition inter-
action, F(2,213) = 9.97, p < .001, h2p = .07, as well as a
supporter emotion condition by opponent emotion
condition interaction, F(4,213) = 2.55, p = .040, h2p
= .05. Simple effects analyses were conducted separ-
ately for supporters and opponents to follow up on
the interactions.
Supporter control. A 3 (opponent emotion condition)
by 3 (supporter emotion condition) ANOVA, revealed
significant main effects of supporter emotion con-
dition, F(2,213) = 7.40, p = .001, h2p = .09, and opponent
emotion condition, F(2,213) = 3.94, p = .021, h2p = .04.
Specifically, when supporters showed awe (M =
2.88, SD = 1.70, CI95% 2.49; 3.27), the expression was
considered significantly less controlled than when
they showed happiness (M = 3.49, SD = 1.65, CI95%
3.15; 3.83) or neutrality (M = 3.66, SD = 1.60, CI95%
3.58; 4.35), which did not differ. Yet, the expression
of the opponent was also taken into consideration.
Specifically, when the opponent showed awe (M =
3.86, SD = 1.71, CI95% 3.51; 4.22), the supporter’s
expressions were considered to be more controlled
than when the opponent showed neutrality, (M =
3.00, SD = 1.61, CI95% 2.58; 3.41) or happiness (M =
3.32, SD = 1.68, CI95% 2.94; 3.71), which did not differ.
Thus, the supporter’s awe was seen as a more
spontaneous expression, congruent with the notion
that this emotion is shown when someone is
overwhelmed by an event (Hareli et al., 2019). Yet,
both neutrality and happiness were seen as more con-
trolled, matching the notion that participants felt that
supporters may not always show what they feel.
Opponent control. A 3 (opponent emotion condition)
by 3 (supporter emotion condition) ANOVA, revealed
only a main effect of opponent emotion condition, F
(2,213) = 6.08, p = .003, h2p = .05, such that the
opponent’s neutral expressions (M = 4.17, SD = 1.76,
CI95% 3.71; 4.61) were considered to be significantly
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more controlled than their awe (M = 3.06, SD = 1.71,
CI95% 2.70; 3.42) and happy expressions (M = 3.43,
SD = 1.53, CI95% 3.09; 3.78), which did not differ. As
neutral expressions were generally perceived as
indicative of a bad performance, this may suggest
that participants felt that an even more negative
emotional reaction, such as anger or sadness, was sup-
pressed. No other significant effects emerged for any
of the reported analyses.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 suggest that participants use the
emotional expressions of both supporter and
opponent as well as their real world knowledge
about these individuals’ motivations to assess the
trustworthiness of the expressions shown. For an
expression to be trustworthy, the expresser has to
be competent and the expression unbiased and not
masked or otherwise controlled. Overall, the findings
support the notion that participants consider suppor-
ters to be more knowledgeable of the game but also
as more biased in judgment and controlled in their
expressions. As such, supporter expressions were per-
ceived as less trustworthy.
These evaluations explain why participants relied
more on the opponent’s expressions and the situa-
tional information signalled by that expression when
evaluating aspects of that supporter’s behaviour
than vice versa. In fact, the opponent’s expression is
largely taken as is and ratings of the opponent’s exper-
tise and control of their expression were not
influenced by the supporter’s behaviour. The notion
that the supporter’s expressions are considered to
be more biased and controlled also explains the stron-
ger effect of opponent emotion on supporter emotion
found in Study 1. These findings further suggest that
participants have naïve emotion theories regarding
the appropriate emotional behaviours of spectators
in a game.
General discussion
The present research provides evidence for the notion
that when asked to rate the emotion of others, partici-
pants consider situational information and world
knowledge about the situational dynamics, including
whom to trust when making their judgment. Impor-
tantly, we could show that the situational information
used may be derived from the very same expressions
that participants were asked to judge. That is, we were
able to show a bidirectional relationship between
situational and expressive information.
Specifically, participants first use the expressions of
others to form an impression of the eliciting event and
then use this expression-derived situational infor-
mation to further adjust their interpretation of these
same expressions. This bidirectional relationship also
extends to related ratings such as the ratings of exper-
tise, bias and control in Study 2. In both studies,
participants did not rely on a single source of infor-
mation, be it the situation or the facial expression of
either opponent or supporter, but rather considered
all these pieces of information to form a holistic
judgement.
We also found indications in Study 1 that in order
to be used as information for perspective taking, a
person’s expression has to be trusted. Study 2
showed that participants implicitly judge the likely
trustworthiness of the expressions they are asked to
rate and again do so by including information
derived from the emotion expression of the respective
other person and real world knowledge about their
motivations. That is, not only judgments of emotion
but also judgments of the spontaneity of the
expression (or its authenticity) are influenced by
reverse engineered social appraisals. Expressions that
suggest that opponents and supporters agree on
their perception of the situation are considered
more trustworthy than expressions that lead to diver-
gent meaning. Expressions that are trustworthy then
are used to fine tune the perception of the other
person’s emotion as shown in Study 1. The present
results therefore substantiate the crucial prediction
of the bidirectional model that both situational infor-
mation and facial expressions enter into social apprai-
sal processes.
Yet, the present research is not without limitations.
First, participants had very limited knowledge of the
game since its rules were unknown to them. We
choose this strategy to control for individual differ-
ences in context knowledge. Yet, it is likely this
forced participants to rely more on the reaction of
spectators than might be the case in typical real-life
situations, where people often have more specific
situational knowledge. Further, many social contexts
do not provide clear information regarding the motiv-
ations of the expressers. This may make it harder to
interpret conflicting facial information from witnesses
to an event. The degree to which such information is
required for social appraisals is a question for future
research. Also, the data were collected in the US. As
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such, cultural notions about “proper” sports spectator
behaviour have certainly informed the judgments. In
fact, the negative interdependence of the reactions
of supporter and opponent are in part derived from
such cultural notions. As such, cultural differences in
the understanding of the roles of opponent and spec-
tator may translate into differences in social appraisal
outcomes. This is a question for future research.
The present findings point to the importance of
situational information for the perception of emotions
as suggested by constructivist approaches to
emotion perception among others (Barrett et al.,
2011; Hess & Hareli, 2016, 2017). However, construc-
tionist approaches to emotion perception consider
this a one-way street in which a clear situational
signal guides the construction of meaning of an
“inherently ambiguous” emotion signal (Barrett et al.,
2011; Hassin et al., 2013, p. 60). By contrast, the
present research shows that the emotion expressions
were used by the participants to reverse engineer
social appraisals in meaningful ways. Such, these
expressions were meaningful in their own right. The
bidirectional social perception model moves past the
traditional view of uniform one directional emotion
communication processes by positing one process
that yields situational information (reverse engineer-
ing) and a second process (perspective taking) that
is applied to modify the very source from which the
situational information is derived.
It is important to note that in the present research
participants and expressers not only did not know
each other but really had no relationship with each
other. Nonetheless participants relied on the expres-
sers to inform them about the situation. However, as
the reduced impact of supporter expressions on
ratings of opponent emotions shows, this reliance is
tempered by participants’ attributed trust to the
emotion expressions. Study 2, in turn showed that
participants seem to hold naïve theories about
whom to trust in a game situation such as the one
used here.
In fact, the present research shows that participants
do not only use expressive and situational information
but also their real world knowledge about game situ-
ations in general. In fact, when the two expressions did
not match, it was real world knowledge about the
negative interdependence of game outcomes that
made a judgment possible. As such, the present
research points to the importance of taking emotion
perception research out of the sandbox provided by
the typical context free stimuli and to acknowledge
that because decoders use all information at their dis-
posal when making emotion judgments, such stimuli
do not elicit the same type of process that is
engaged by richer stimulus material. Hence, to really
understand emotion communication we have to
study this process holistically by including all relevant
sources of information.
In conclusion, the present research provided evi-
dence that participants use not only facial expressions
or situational information or their own naïve theories
when making emotion judgments, but rather use all
sources of information. In this they balance the infor-
mation from each source, weigh it by its trustworthi-
ness and adjust mismatches in line with their
understanding of the situation. This implies on one
hand that emotion recognition is a complex social
act and on the other that both the situation and
emotional facial expressions have well interpretable
intrinsic meaning.
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